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An Introduction to Joint Powers Authorities, Their
Funding Mechanisms, and Why California Should
Utilize One in Order to Create an Effective Forest
Management System to Prevent Wildfires
Anna Bernstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of ever-increasing incidences of wildfires across
California,1 cost-effective, practical, and functional forest management has
become a priority in order to keep California’s land and residents safe. From
2018 to 2020, six out of ten of California’s worst fires, coined “megafires”
by the United States Forest Service (“USFS”), have rampaged through the
state.2 These megafires often behave in unstoppable ways. Most recently, in
2018, they killed more than a hundred people and destroyed seventeen
thousand homes, all while burning hundreds of thousands of acres across
California.3 Although the end of the recent drought has brought some relief,
record-breaking rains have created an expected, yet dangerous, growth of
brush and grass that just adds fuel to the fire.4
Though specific tools and techniques for wildfire forest management
remain relatively elusive, especially given a general inability to predict brush
fires, let alone megafires, certain forest management methods could at least
curtail the catastrophic outcomes of such megafires.5 Prescribed burns and
mechanical thinning, for example, remain achievable options.6 Prescribed
burning refers to a technique in which fire experts use planned fire to restore

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2021; B.A.
Psychology/Political Science, Syracuse University 2017.
1. Nicole Twilley, A Trailblazing Plan to Fight California Wildfires, NEW YORKER (Aug. 26,
2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/08/26/a-trailblazing-plan-to-fight-california-wild
fires.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Larissa L. Yocom, Fuel Treatment Longevity 2 (Ecological Restoration Institute, Working
Paper No. 27, 2013).
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the health of the ecosystem.7 Mechanical thinning is a separate technique,
often used in conjunction with prescribed burning, in which extremely
flammable or excess vegetation is removed from an ecosystem to lower the
risk of wildfire.8 However, forest management methodology is not the
biggest impediment to wildfire prevention. Realistically, there will never be
an end-all-be-all solution because of the nature of wildfires. Instead, by
focusing on what is possible, the biggest dilemma at present is the
complicated nexus concerning the best possible methodology in the context
of the vast amount of forested acreage with limited resources. A widespread
and vital management system must rely on a multitude and combination of
funding from various sources in order to work effectively.
Most notable of which are the use of Memorandum of Understandings
(“MOUs”)9 and Joint Powers Authorities (otherwise known as Joint Powers
Agencies and Joint Powers Agreements (all termed “JPAs”)) across the
affected counties. MOUs, a helpful template for future contractual
obligations, may not provide a substantial enforcement action even if
enforcement mechanisms are included in the memorandum due to its nonbinding characteristics.10 JPAs, on the other hand, allow broad and efficient
power without voter approval.11 JPAs create a theoretical “blended family”
of government functions, whereby multiple agencies and entities with
varying interests, motivations, and cultures, create a new entity with a
specific goal.12 In the present context, JPAs appear to provide the most
efficient mechanisms for forestry management in the specific participating
counties.
Many California counties would greatly benefit from the formation of
a JPA that implements forest management and wildfire prevention.
Specifically, counties with expansive forest and federal land would benefit
greatly from JPA formation. Placer, Amador, Tuolumne, El Dorado,
7. Prescribed Fire, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire/prescribe
ed-fire, (last visited Mar 4, 2020).
8. Mechanical Treatment, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire/mec
hanical-treatment, (last visited Mar 4, 2020).
9. An MOU is typically a non-binding signed agreement between parties that outlines the
expectations and relationship of those involved. MOUs are not considered binding because of the level
of specificity involved; the writing is usually a barebones contract that leaves a lot of information out at
the discretion of the signing parties and would therefore leave any arising issues without a remedy or
course of action. See generally Rita Leader, Contract or Memorandum of Understanding – The
Differences and Uses You Should Know, Score: Houston (Mar. 7, 2017), https://houston.score.org/
blog/contract-or-memorandum-understanding-–-differences-and-uses-you-should-know.
10. Id.
11. TRISH CYPHER & COLIN GRINNELL, S. LOCAL GOV’T COMMITTEE, GOVERNMENTS WORKING
TOGETHER: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO JOINT POWERS AGREEMENTS, S. 2007-2008, Sess., at 13 (Ca. 2007).
12. JOAN CASSMAN & JEAN SAVAREE, LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, JOINT POWERS
AUTHORITIES: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 1 (2002).
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Yosemite, and Mono counties, located in the Lower Sierra area of the United
States, are potential contracting entities to the JPA given their location.13
Other counties that have already been directly affected by large fires, such
as Yolo, Yuba, Lake, Napa, and Mendocino counties would also likely
benefit from an improvement in forest and land management.14 Together,
these counties and other relevant environmental agencies binding together
through a JPA would create a useful entity that aims to make land safer in
the event of future wildfires.
The main disadvantage of JPAs, however, is the difficulty in funding
appropriately. Generally, JPAs are funded either by issuing bonds or other
internal sources of revenue.15

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY
The last seven years have been especially rough on California. A
succession of warm, dry winters caused California to experience the most
severe draught in its recorded history.16 This has caused a massive increase
in the incidence of wildfires in addition to general economic and
environmental stress on the farming industry.17 As it pertains to wildfires,
climate change affects local climates by raising temperatures and creating
much drier conditions.18 The science is simple—the hotter the temperature,
the faster the land dries out, and the easier the vegetation is to ignite during
wildfire season. In addition, climate change also affects the water cycles. For
example, El Nino events that would normally play at least somewhat of a
helpful role in decreasing already dangerous drought conditions are
happening less often.19 Comparatively, wetter regions of forests are far less
vulnerable because fires have a much harder time spreading quickly.20 Even
without other contributory variables coming into play, rising temperatures
13. Telephone Interview with Christiana Darlington, General Counsel, Mendocino Air Quality
Management District (Sept. 11, 2019).
14. 2017 California Wildfires, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Dec. 2017), https://www.census.gov/topics/
preparedness/events/wildfires/2017-ca-wildfires.html.
15. TRISH CYPHER & COLIN GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 19.
16. Richard Seagar et al., Causes of the 2011-2014 California Drought, 28 J. OF CLIMATE 6997,
6997 (2015); Jin-Ho Yoon et al., Increasing Water Cycle Extremes in California and in Relation to ENSO
Cycle Under Global Warming, 6 NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 1-2 (Oct. 21, 2015).
17. Yoon, supra note 16.
18. Id. at 2.
19. Thomas Kitzberger et al., Contingent Pacific-Atlantic Ocean Influence on Multicentury
Wildfire Synchrony Over Western North America, 102 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF
THE U.S. 543, 543–47 (2007).
20. Elizabeth Hall, The Science of Wildland Fire, COMMUNICATOR’S GUIDE (last visited Feb. 22,
2020), available at https://web.archive.org/web/20081105175208/http://www.nifc.gov/preved/commgui
de/wildfire/fire_4.html.
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and drier conditions via changing water cycles alone are ultimate players in
the increase of megafires throughout California.
Generally, weather, climate, fuel pattern, and topography are the most
important factors driving fire activity.21 Weather and climate are particularly
significant, which helps to explain why California has been so susceptible to
wildfires.22 Like much of the western United States, California gets most of
its moisture during the fall and winter seasons.23 The vegetation then dries
out during the spring and the summer seasons.24 This is precisely why
warmer and drier winters directly correlate to devastating wildfires.25
Though the most influential of the factors are weather and climate,
forest management is incredibly important in decreasing the likelihood of
catastrophic effects resulting from wildfires. Yet, despite the multitudes of
forest management methods (i.e. mechanical thinning, prescribed fires, etc.),
California has yet to establish an effective widespread system for general
wildfire and megafire prevention. It is therefore sensible to look to other
jurisdictions, agencies, and localities to determine methods that California
may find beneficial, such as the “best practices” method.26 Other
jurisdictions may have developed useful, cost-effective systems to deal with
the policy problem at hand.27
Though this Note will not determine which forest management is in fact
the “best practice,” if California does decide to form a JPA for this purpose,
it should look to other counties, states, and countries for innovations that may
in fact work well in a JPA setup. This becomes complicated, however, due
to the natural complexity of forest management that is attributable to the
diverse use of land.28 For example, on one end of the spectrum, the forested
area may be federal land without any private property or recreational
opportunities nearby. On the other hand, forested land without absolute
defined property rights, or with an abundance of private property and
recreational activities, creates hazards and forest management issues that
must be taken into account prior to determining the best fire management
method.
21. Mario G. Pereira et al., Effects of Regional Climate Change on Rural Fires in Portugal, 57
CLIMATE RES. 187, 187–200 (2013).
22. Id.
23. Kendra Pierre-Louis, California Emerged From Drought and Is Still Catching Fire, N.Y TIMES
(Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/25/climate/california-fires-climate-change.html.
24. Id.
25. Seagar, supra note 16.
26. EUGENE BARDACH & ERIC PATASHNIK, A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR POLICY ANALYSIS: THE
EIGHTFOLD PATH TO MORE EFFECTIVE PROBLEM SOLVING 125 (2016).
27. Id. at 125–126.
28. Forest Service, Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, National Forest System
Land Management Planning (U.S.D.A. 2012).
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Types of farming and forest systems are categorized differently
depending on what is growing, and, further, the fire regimes (which describes
the nature of fires occurring over an extended period of time in a particular
area) are greatly dependent on the vegetation in the surrounding area.29 For
example, in an Ethiopian forest-livestock system where coffee, banana, and
other perennial crops are grown, there is a cultivation shift every seven to
eight years, which in turn threatens proper forest conservation.30 In those
same Ethiopian forests, having external information regarding technological
advancements in livestock and crop production creates variation in forest
health and restoration, which, of course, can affect the fire regime.31
Alternatively, in Idaho and Montana, where the vast forests tend to be
Ponderosa pine and Douglas fir with many shade-tolerant trees, the USFS
tends to favor an almost complete absence of human interference based on
the ecological role of fire in nature.32 In the areas surrounding Lake Tahoe
in California and Nevada, where human development and recreational
activities are constant year-round, a more hands-on approach is necessary to
ensure the safety of the people in the area.33 Specifically, it is no longer
appropriate to simply put fires out when they start.34 Instead, USFS
recognizes that in the Lake Tahoe area, preventative measures such as
prescribed burning and detailed fuel management (taking into account the
fuel necessary for prescribed fires as it affects the surrounding population) is
necessary to protect the surrounding population from deviations in healthy
water and air quality.35
Given the nature of the wide variety of forest land and property that
forest management JPAs would encompass, it is vital to note that there are
potential “best practices”36 that would benefit different areas within the JPA.
Some counties may be prone to fire given their vegetation types, while other
counties have less fire-prone vegetation but have more human development
requiring different forest management practices to protect the county’s
citizens properly.

29. Nicolas Barbier, The Controversial Management of Fire in the National Forests of Idaho and
Western Montana, 304 J. OF ALPINE RESEARCH, Apr. 2015.
30. Wondimagegnehu Girma & Fekadu Beyene, Institutional Challenges in Sustainable Forest
Management: Evidence from the Gambella Regional State of Western Ethiopia, 34 J. OF SUSTAINABLE
FORESTRY 233, 233–58 (2015).
31. Id.
32. Barbier, supra note 29, at 4.
33. Lake Tahoe Land Management Plan: Environmental Impact Statement, UNITED STATES DEPT.
OF AGRIC. FOREST SERV. 105 (1981).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. BARDACH & PATASHNIK, supra note 26, at 125.
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III. JOINT POWERS AUTHORITIES
Joint Powers Authorities, or JPAs, are exercised when officials from
various public agencies, such as state departments, counties, cities, and
school districts, create a legal entity designed to focus on a specific project
or common problem. The language in the state law authorizing the formation
of JPAs explicitly allow the participating public agencies to “jointly exercise
any power common to the contracting parties,” which includes, but is not
limited to, “levy[ing] a fee, assessment or tax.”37
JPAs come in all shapes, sizes, and forms, as provided by the broad
authorizing language in the California Joint Exercise of Powers Act.38
Although common functions of JPAs include developing projects regarding
groundwater management, sports stadium construction, and regional
transportation projects, the language itself authorizes JPA formation to make
any public capital improvement.39 In fact, section 6502 of the California
Government Code explicitly gives the Resource Conservation Energy JPA
authority to produce biogas and electricity from animal and agricultural
waste.40 The Resource Conservation Energy JPA shows how expansive a
JPA power can be: it is allowed to undertake projects both in its own
jurisdictions and outside of its jurisdiction in multiple other counties.41 This
is precisely one of the functions that a forest management JPA should use its
power to emulate. Creating “feedstock” contracts, where the accumulation
of agricultural waste is converted into biofuels, bioproducts, and biopower
and then sold, would be a practical use of the agriculture waste from the
forested land.42
In California, the public agencies entering into the entity do not need to
be based in California (or the respective state that governs).43 Specifically, a
group of California public agencies can form a JPA in conjunction with a
federal public agency based in an entirely different state. A JPA formed on
the California border in conjunction with public agencies in Nevada may be
beneficial because it will allow for greater flexibility, expansive power, and
generally more applicable knowledge in the execution of specific forest
management projects. For example, a theoretical public agency in Nevada
might have more knowledge and understanding of how an agriculture entity

37. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019).
38. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019).
39. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6588 (Deering 2019).
40. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502.5 (Deering 2019).
41. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019).
42. Biomass Feedstocks, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.
energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
43. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6500 (Deering 2019).
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in California could operate more smoothly.
There are a multitude of procedural requirements needed to complete
the JPA formation. These include, but are not limited to, filing the notice of
agreement, filing a copy, and filing the correct amount in fees.44 Though
these can be complicated due to the level of detail and attention required, as
long as the procedural barriers are overcome, the JPA is a useful tool because
of its broad power.
The statutory language, though broad in the sense that it allows for large
variation in JPA actions and membership, could be considered narrow in
terms of its power. Specifically, the language maintains that the JPA must
operate by way of the pre-existing power common to the contracting
parties.45 This means that the agencies participating in the JPA must have a
common interest, or a service, that is common to all. For example, in
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler, a JPA was
formed between Burbank, Pasadena, and Glendale, California, in order to
operate Burbank airport.46 The JPA, in an effort to construct a taxiway
extension and service road, used eminent domain powers to acquire the
property needed.47 The property owner contested this by arguing that the JPA
did not encompass this type of authority.48 The California Courts of Appeal,
however, confirmed that each individual city had the power to use eminent
domain to seize property and thus had the power to confer this common
ability unto the JPA authority.’49 In San Francisco v. Boyle, a JPA project
that aimed to treat inmates with tuberculosis more effectively was upheld
because both agencies that had entered into the agreement, San Francisco
and Alameda County, were given legislative authority to legislate over the
given subjects.50 Specifically, since both agencies had the authority to
purchase land for a new hospital, build a hospital, and acquire the proper
equipment to run the hospital, there was no issue in relation to whether the
JPA could do these exact duties.51 In other words, the charter of a JPA does
not grant new powers to the legal entity; instead, the charter provides a new
method of exercising previously established authority.52
Although the common power prerequisite does set restrictive limits on
creating JPAs with public agencies that are entirely unrelated in scope, the
44. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6503.8 (Deering 2019).
45. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019).
46. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Authority v. Hensler, 83 Cal. App. 4th 556, 558 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000).
47. Id. at 558–59.
48. Id. at 561.
49. Id. at 562.
50. San Francisco v. Boyle, 191 Cal. 172, 174 (Cal. 1923).
51. Id. at 184.
52. Oakland v. Williams, 15.Cal.2d 542, 549 (Cal. 1940) [hereinafter Williams].
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prerequisite is actually a helpful tool to effectuate effectiveness and
efficiency. Public agencies that have little in common would likely
accomplish their goals less effectively than agencies that are already aligned
in terms of their purpose.
This concept is emulated in a journal article that draws insights and aims
to develop specific guidelines for the most effective local groundwater
governance in California.53 Since groundwater is poorly understood, with
many intricacies and nuanced strategies for upkeep and implementation, the
authors suggest that any local governance without sound knowledge would
be a disservice to actual progress.54 The article concedes that in order for
groundwater governance to be effective, there must be actual knowledge of
the groundwater system.55 Therefore, these limits allow for agencies with
actual knowledge to work with other knowledgeable groups, imparting
project knowledge off of the other groups and consequentially coming up
with better ideas, faster.
The same standard of governance should apply to a JPA that aims to
formulate effective forest management mechanisms. Although financially it
may be beneficial to employ a large number of lucrative public agencies that
can easily provide funding, the end product would take much more time and
effort to organize their goals and intentions in a practical way than a JPA
chartered with purpose-oriented public agencies.
That said, the flexibility and expansive power given to the
administration of JPAs explains why it would work well with the complex
and difficult project at hand. The common service requirement will
additionally be satisfied here given the nature of this particular project and
its proposed agency and county involvement.
Other public, goal-oriented agencies charted for a specific
responsibility could garner a symbiotic relationship from the collaboration.
Any environmental management, land management, or even more
specifically, a wildfire management agency, is likely to benefit from the
combined personnel of a group so dedicated to a specific initiative (in terms
of ideas, collaborative plans, and even a physical work force). For example,
the National Park Service joining a JPA could be helpful by providing
information on its specific national park management, upkeep mechanisms,
and benefit from partnering with counties to enable efficiency and speed in
completion of the said management and upkeep techniques. Further, the
common power requirement will easily be satisfied because of the general
53. See generally Michael Kiparsky et al., The Importance of Institutional Design for Distributed
Local-Level Governance of Groundwater: The Case of California’s Sustainable Groundwater
Management Act, 9 WATER RES. (2017).
54. Williams, 15.Cal.2d 542 at 755.
55. Kiparsky, supra note 53.
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broad power given to California counties in regard to keeping their citizens
safe in conjunction with the power of public forestry agencies in creating
proper safety mechanisms.
The amalgamation of forces would clearly benefit the greater purpose
behind creating an effective forest management and wildfire prevention
system. The issue remains, however, as to how exactly the project will fund
itself. Without a proper funding plan, it is possible that agencies that would
otherwise join the JPA will decide against it because of the unknown
economic risks associated with involvement. Therefore, a well-planned and
organized funding arrangement is necessary to encourage contracting
agencies to participate in the JPA.

A. JPA FUNDING
JPAs are typically funded through either issuing revenue bonds or an
internal revenue stream.56 The authority for JPAs to float bonds is supported
by both legislation and case law. In Rider v. City of San Diego, a local
taxpayer challenged the validity of a financing plan created in a JPA between
the San Diego Unified Port District (“Port District”) and the city of San
Diego.57 Together, the two entities formed a JPA with the intention of
funding a convention center.58 Their financial agreement was complex, but,
in essence, they arranged for the city of San Diego to pay the lease revenue
bonds to the JPA through rental payments for the convention center.59 The
local taxpayer argued that the JPA was just a “shell” of a government that
exists only on paper: Both San Diego’s mayor and manager sit on the JPA
governing board and help in the planning and construction of the convention
center and thus, the JPA was just an extension of the city.60 Because of this,
the city was financing a debt (the rental payments) that two thirds of San
Diego voters did not agree to pursuant to the requirements of the city’s
charter and the Constitution.61 The court, in its opinion approving the JPA’s
bond issuance, stated that a JPA is not included in the California Constitution
as a public entity that requires a two-third vote to incur any indebtedness,
despite the inclusion of “city” on the list.62
Rider, therefore, emphasizes that a city’s own need to gain approval
from their voters to incur any indebtedness does not apply to a JPA that forms
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11.
Rider v. City of San Diego, 18 Cal. 4th 1035, 1039 (Cal. 1998) [hereinafter Rider].
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id. at 1043.
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out of that same city. In sum, a JPA does not need to follow its contracting
party’s obligations in regard to issuing revenue bonds to finance a project.
The legislation is just as clear. California Government Code section
6546 explicitly provides that a JPA “may issue revenue bonds” in order to
“pay the cost and expenses of acquiring or constructing a project or
conducting a program.”63 The statute goes on to list a number of projects and
programs that are often financed through issuing revenue bonds. The list
includes, but is not in any way limited to, the financing of parks, local streets,
mass transit facilities, low-income housing facilities, and, most relevantly
for the purposes of a forestry management JPA, “public improvements.”64
Section 6547, however, makes clear that the power to issue these bonds does
not derive from the independent contracting parties themselves.65 The law
states that “the issuance of bonds, financing, or refinancing . . . need not
comply with the requirements of any other state laws applicable to the
issuance of bonds.”66 Instead, the authority to issue bonds, among other
financing methods, is derived from governing state law that authorizes the
agency or authority to do so.67 In other words, when exercising its power to
float bonds, the JPA itself has the individual right, not the parties that entered
into the JPA.
In 1985, an amendment to the Joint Exercise of Powers Act broadened
the statutory language even further.68 Specifically, the authority to issue
bonds was expanded to “pay the cost of any public capital improvement,”69
which includes major public expenditures ranging from the purchase of
equipment for a public park to the acquisition and use of land for a public
purpose.70 The amendment further removed obstacles that prevented bond
“pooling,” thus allowing JPAs and other governmental entities to
significantly reduce capital costs through consolidation of individual bond
issues.71 The legislature, therefore, could not have made the authority to issue
revenue bonds on behalf of the JPA clearer.72

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6546 (Deering 2019).
Id.
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6547 (Deering 2019).
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6547 (Deering 2019).
Rider, 18 Cal.4th at 1039.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1051.
Planning Implementation Tools: Capital Improvement Plan, CENTER FOR LAND USE
EDUCATION, https://www.uwsp.edu/cnr-ap/clue/Documents/PlanImplementation/Capital_Improvement
_Plan.pdf, (last visited Mar. 9, 2020).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1052.
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B. ISSUING REVENUE BONDS ON BEHALF OF JPAS
Because upfront costs are usually high for the implementation of the
new programs, issuing revenue bonds is quite helpful due to the immediacy
of the funding. In fact, multiple cities across California have realized the
benefits of JPAs because of their ability to overcome the large hurdle of
initial investments for a project.73 Lancaster, California, created a JPA solely
for its financing abilities. Because of the high upfront costs of solar energy
projects, Lancaster and San Jacinto utilized the financing nature of a JPA to
equip 100% of the schools and ninety-seven percent of the municipal
buildings with solar power.74 Likewise, Las Virgenes knew that a solar
power system would save them two million dollars over the next twenty
years, but understood how high the upfront costs would be. Therefore, it
formed the Las Virgines-Triunfo JPA in order to front the costs and was
ultimately able to dramatically lower utility bills quickly, which allowed
them to generate actual savings on energy costs.75 This bond issuing
authority, however, has not been without controversy.
Many complaints have been filed against JPAs in regard to issuing
revenue bonds—most commonly when a plaintiff believes that one or more
of the contracting parties (often cities, counties, and towns) must follow their
own governing legislative and jurisdictional requirements before the JPAs
authority is triggered. However, there is substantive case law showing that
this is not the case.
The authority to issue revenue bonds for “any public capital
improvement” is an established, broad power.76
Any contentions that arise concerning the issuance of revenue bonds
should follow the broadly recognized case law and legislation. Policy-wise,
the Rider court recognized that due to the antiquated requirements regarding
voter approval for indebtedness, courts should continue to broadly construe
this language in order to encourage economic development and avoid rigid
requirements that hinder modern urbanization.77 Any public agency that
decides to contract into the JPA for a particular forest management project
must still individually hew to its own legal limitations. However, based on
the above analysis and policy implications of having broad authority, the
proposed JPA should have no issue floating revenue bonds to fund the
project. Any contentions that do arise will likely stem from the expansive
73. Cost Savings Through JPA-Financed Retrofits, INDEP. CITIES FINANCE AUTHORITY,
https://www.icfauthority.org/cost-savings-through-jpa-financed-retrofits/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2019).
74. Rider, 18 Cal. 4th at 1039–40.
75. Id.
76. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6588 (Deering 2019).
77. Rider, 18 Cal. 4th at 1046.
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geographic nature of the joint authorities. Given this expansive geographic
nature, all contracting parties may disagree on the specific usage of the
funding because each area may need something very different (e.g. one
county may want more funding to go towards feedstock contracts, while
other counties may need physical personnel to maintain forestland).
However, these logistical components can be determined at a later point in
the process based on expert calculations of the specific needs of each county.
Though it is still unclear exactly which counties in California will, or
should, be participating, such an expansive project could inevitably spark
frustration by taxpayers and residents of these counties who are paying for
other counties’ forest management. Especially given the nature of
wildfires—unpredictable in both timing and devastation—one county’s
taxpayers could pay for the forest management and emergency fire
procedures of another county halfway across the state. Of course, plenty of
taxpayers already feel strongly about the amount they are paying in taxes,
and any money that is not going back into their pockets, or at the very least
not contributing directly to their domicile of choice, can potentially cause a
stir. This is quite potentially at the core of why other potential plaintiffs, like
that in Rider, want to file suit: they feel strongly about their taxes going
somewhere tangible.
Cities, counties, towns, and school districts (the list goes on) have the
legislative authority to issue revenue bonds for this reason. Though it is true
that an entity’s taxes may be going to another distant county’s forest
management and their ensuing safety, the greater goal of public funding for
important projects should take priority over individual interests. For
instance, JPAs are often created for proper disposal of hazardous waste. Zero
Waste Marin, a JPA formed north of San Francisco in Marin County, aims
to design and manage products that eliminate the volume of toxic waste and
materials in the area.78 Though Petaluma, on the upper edge of the North Bay
in Sonoma County, is about 5 miles north of the Marin County line,
Petaluma residents’ tax dollars go towards the hazardous waste removal in
Marin. The end result, though potentially bothersome for Petaluma residents,
allows for safer waste removal and consequentially a safer system overall.
Based on the above analysis, it becomes clear why issuing revenue bonds is
a popular way to finance an expensive JPA project.

78. What is Zero Waste?, ZERO WASTE MARIN, https://zerowastemarin.org/who-we-are/what-iszero-waste/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
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1. Issuing Revenue Bonds Specific to this Project
For the JPA proposed, one way that revenue bonds could be
incorporated into the financing structure would be to organize Good
Neighbor Agreements (“GNAs”) with the United States Forest Service
(“USFS”) in order to create feedstock contracts.
GNAs are legally binding agreements that are negotiated by an industry
(such as the forestry industry) and additional stakeholders in order to reduce
or eliminate environmental risks to a community or population.79 GNAs
gained popularity after the realization that private remedies, such as
nuisance, trespass, and negligence law, were ill-suited to deal with
environmental problems.80 Further, common law was unable to alleviate the
burden of monitoring and policing externalities on individual and
community action claims.81 Therefore, GNAs are nowadays generally
viewed as helpful, faster, and more effective than litigation which does not
allow the same flexibility to negotiate terms of an agreement.82 Luckily,
based on the Joint Exercise of Powers Act, a JPA is allowed to enter into
agreements with other public agencies in order to furnish other services,
provide materials, or perform work.83 California Government Code section
6503.1 even explicitly allows for tax revenues of a county to be allocated for
the purpose of fire protection, as long as the funds are appropriated for those
“fire protection purposes.”84 This would work perfectly here because the
bond funds would go directly back to the feedstock contract formation and
execution.
Though prescribed burns are a helpful tool in wildfire prevention and
management, some land makes it difficult to safely make use of the
prescribed burning method.85 In these cases, the USFS makes use of
mechanical treatment: reducing the dangerous levels of vegetation that have
built up in the fires either by thinning, pruning, or piling of brush and
deadwood in order to make the area better able to withstand fire.86 This
process, though, can be extremely time consuming and require a lot of
personnel given the sheer amount of acreage covered for this particular
79. Thalia Gonzalez & Giovanni Saarman, Regulating Pollutants, Negative Externalities, and
Good Neighbor Agreements: Who Bears the Burden of Protecting Communities, 41 ECOLOGY L. Q. 37,
40 (2015).
80. Id. at 51.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6514.5 (Deering 2019).
84. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6503.1 (Deering 2019).
85. Mechanical Treatment, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.usda.gov/managing-land/fire
/mechanical-treatment, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
86. Id.
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project. Additionally, though some of the tools used for this maintenance are
simply rakes and chainsaws, some of the hardier work requires heavy
machinery such as bulldozers and woodchippers which require trained
workers.87 Plainly, a project of this magnitude would need to have many
highly trained individuals working to accomplish the forest management
objectives. The USFS, generally, has their own methodology and workforce
to accomplish their own goal of fire safety.88
For the purposes of this JPA, the very materials that pose a fire risk can
be transformed into a revenue stream to finance fire prevention efforts
through the use of feedstock contracts. A potential partner in this would be
the USFS, which has its own mission to ensure the safety of the public.
“Feedstock” contracts with the USFS are therefore a feasible revenue source.
Feedstocks are an accumulation of biomass, plants, and plant-based
materials that are not used for food, but instead are converted into biofuels,
bioproducts, and biopower.89 Feedstocks are beneficial because of their
renewable and environmentally friendly nature: The biofuel, bioproducts,
and biopower are transformed entirely from renewably carbon sources
expand biomass resource potential.90
In order to create revenue, and under the terms of a GNA, the USFS
would have to receive funding from the JPA (from the revenue bonds) to
collect the biomass across all of the national parks and forests in California
(or any that were particularly decided upon in the language of the JPA). That
way, no extra training for use of machinery would be necessary, and
meticulous, seasoned professionals would do the necessary work, ultimately
eliminating extra costs in hiring and training additional staff for more
expansive work. The immediately available funding from the JPAs (from the
issued revenue bonds) would assure that the trained workers are paid in
accordance with their employment contracts and would continue to complete
the work in a timely manner. In contrast, emergency work pay can result in
late payments to workers and can discourage field workers from agreeing to
extra time and shifts, thus resulting in the need to hire and train additional
staff.91
87. Id.
88. Improving forest conditions remains an important goal of the USFS. Specifically, restoring and
maintaining land at risk of fire and effectuating safe and risk-based wildfire response is vital to the
organization; see generally Fire Management Today: September 2019, Vol. 77, No. 3, U.S. DEPT. OF
AGRIC.,
https://www.fs.usda.gov/sites/default/files/fire-management-today/Fire_Mngt_v77_3%205
08.pdf, (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
89. Biomass Feedstocks, OFF. OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY, https://www.
energy.gov/eere/bioenergy/biomass-feedstocks, (last visited Feb. 22, 2020).
90. Id.
91. Improving Performance: A Review of Pay-For-Performance Systems in the Federal
Government: Hearing Before the Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the
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Because several national forests and federal lands spread across the
counties that are at risk of deadly wildfires and megafires, creating a GNA
between the USFS and the JPA would assure that forests are receiving
necessary mechanical treatments and generating necessary revenue for the
JPA entity.92
Similar to the above-mentioned issue with common law remedies to
environmental concerns, private actions to remove the deadwood and brush
would not be effective. A nuisance claim, for example, would be hard to
establish because most of the land at issue is already on federal land, leaving
the deadwood and brush removal task at the same familiar standstill because
there is no legal remedy to get it removed. But the dead biomass still needs
to be collected to prevent wildfires, even if it is not being sold for the
adherence to feedstock contracts. Here, a GNA would be beneficial for all
parties involved. The prevention of environmental risks, a main objective
behind GNAs, would be enhanced by eliminating the environmental risks of
allowing deadwood and dangerous brush to pile up during fire seasons.
Thereafter, the USFS could sell the feedstocks to companies and
agencies that could then convert them into the bioenergy, thus creating
tangible revenue. Not only are feedstock contracts useful to the environment
more generally due to their utilization and creation of renewable resources
to power heavy machinery, but also because this process will simultaneously
contribute to the clearing of the forest and consequent wildfire prevention.
Both of these incentives working in conjunction will ideally generate a
stronger forest management system that helps to sustain forests.
Creating feedstock contracts with land management agencies may be
beneficial for creating revenue streams from the acquired revenue bonds.
However, this method is not the only potential revenue-inducing idea. One
example comes in the wake of the 2017 California fire season. Researchers
in Santa Cruz began to recognize that the USFS has an affinity for the large
trees in the forest.93 Instead, centralizing the industry around smaller, more
dispensable trees could be a new method in using renewable resources to
generate revenue.94 In Europe, smaller trees and their lumber are often used
to engineer a product called “cross-laminated lumber,” which can be used in
the construction of multistory buildings.95 Alternatively, much more

District of Columbia Subcommittee of the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs,
110th Cong. (2008) (statement of John Gage, President, American Federation of Government
Employees).
92. Interactive Visitor Map, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://www.fs.fed.us/ivm/, (last visited Feb. 22,
2020).
93. Twilley, supra note 1.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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specific, smaller-scale projects could also be a part of the JPA financing plan.
For example, one idea is to burn waste wood and brush in order to heat
greenhouse-aquaculture operations to fund his fertilizer business.96
Again, the mentioned mechanisms for creating a revenue stream are
nonexhaustive. There are a number of ideas that would be beneficial to
explore further in this context. The JPA could explore a variety of
ecofriendly and innovative ideas that aim to rid land of fire fuel in exchange
for revenue. In fact, because the JPA can enter into agreements with public
agencies as it sees fit,97 it could enter into multiple agreements at once. For
example, one focus area could be the clearance of deadwood on private
property that does not fall under the federal land umbrella but nevertheless
may need help with clearing. Feedstock contracts with the USFS,
meanwhile, could simultaneously continue to focus on expansive federal
forest land.
There is no state or JPA regulatory legislation that keeps JPAs from
having a variety of funding from the issuance of bonds and other internal
revenue streams. Therefore, this JPA should make use of the revenue bonds
to fund not only feedstock contracts with the USFS, but other agreements
and systems that promote forest safety and generate revenue simultaneously.

C. TAX-INCREMENT FINANCING
Tax increment financing (“TIF”), or a tax that emulates this system,
would be a helpful financing tool used within the proposed JPA system in
order to finance the entire project. TIF is a taxing system aimed at promoting
economic development in certain areas.98 More specifically, TIF provides
tax-base neutral funding for blighted or potentially blighted areas within a
given municipal area.99 TIF has been a helpful tool to raise property values,
revitalize economic activity, and even promote the aesthetic appeal of
communities. The imperfection in its application, however, is important to
recognize if implemented here.100
1. History and Background of Tax-Increment Financing
TIF gained widespread popularity in the early 1970s, though it was used
as early as the 1950s when the federal government was an active player in
96.
97.
98.

Id.
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019).
Richard Wagner, Tax Increment Financing: History, Basics, Issues, and Evolution, 20 J. OF
APPLIED BUS. & ECON. 95, 95 (2018).
99. Id.
100. Id.
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urban communities.101 Indeed, the Great Depression contributed to the
beginning of TIF in practice.102
As the inadequacy and unaffordability of housing continued to be
problematic in the 1920s, the government sought to facilitate economic
activity following the market crash in 1929, which had only made the
housing conditions worse.103 For example, government agencies, such as the
Public Works Administration (“PWA”), which goals included hunkering
down on substandard housing standards and creating housing projects, were
created with the intention to facilitate said economic activity.104 The PWA
was authorized to perform certain activities, such as engaging in construction
and rehabilitation of low-rent housing.105 This government agency was
paramount to the development of the TIF system, as this was the first time
the federal government used private housing investments to serve a greater
public purpose (though no actual bonds were issued at the time, this is where
the idea sprung).106 As the depression era ended, the intentions of the
government authorities began to shift as a reflection on the changing political
climate.107 Instead of continuing to focus on urban poverty and slums,
amendments were made in the TIF to include more generic economic issues,
hence where TIF started to flourish in other areas and industries.108
Redevelopment agencies (“RDAs”) authorized by the Community
Redevelopment Act of 1945, had initially used federal funding to finance
their urban redevelopment programs.109 Seven years later, Proposition 18110
authorized the RDAs to utilize TIF.111 After authorization, the sponsoring
agency selected an area where TIF would occur, assessed the value of the
property within that general area, and then those values froze until the
specific project was completed.112 During the frozen period, the government
collected and distributed the property taxes from those properties, just as they
would without a defined area of the project.113 The tax revenues from the

101. Id. at 96–97.
102. Id. at 96.
103. Id. at 97.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Casey Blount et al., Redevelopment Agencies in California: History, Benefits, Excesses, and
Closures (U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev., Working Paper No. EMAD-2014-01, 2014).
110. Proposition 18 was a 1952 initiative that ultimately established TIF and created flexibility for
RDAs. Id. at 1.
111. Id.
112. Wagner, supra note 98, at 96.
113. Id.
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assessed values were then used to service the TIF bonds.114 Although TIF
increased the flexibility of agencies’ redevelopment plans, it diverted
property tax revenue from cities and counties.115 For example, there may
have been significant revenue as a result of a specific redevelopment agency
utilizing TIF, but because the money was funneled into a specific channel, a
school district, for instance, it reduced the amount of funding derived from
taxes for other agencies.116 Therefore, when some agencies thrived because
of TIF, it was at the expense of other agencies that did not establish TIF
districts in a specific vicinity.117 Because of the inequity, California tried, on
multiple occasions, to regulate TIFs in terms of tax percentage limits and
shifting excess funding.118 In fact, In 2011, Governor Brown called for the
dissolution of redevelopment agencies and a redistribution of property tax
revenues through Proposition 22.119 Though contended by RDAs statewide,
the Supreme Court of California eventually upheld the portion of the
proposition that authorized dissolution of redevelopment agencies.120
The destruction of redevelopment agencies slowed the progression and
popularity of TIFs in California. JPAs were still authorized to use financing
mechanisms that were within their prescribed legislative and judicial
authority, however.121 This forest management JPA should thus consider the
use of TIF and other similar financing methods, discussed below, to
supplement the issuance of any revenue bonds.
California Proposition 218 also significantly changed local government
finance, which indirectly put limits on TIF systems.122 Specifically,
Proposition 218 placed limits on fee-based structured financing.123 The
proposition restricted property-related fees, i.e. any fee imposed as an
“incident of property ownership.”124 This Proposition became contentious
because sometimes fees that were indeed incident to property ownership
were still service based, such as fee metered water usage, whereas the
intention of the fee limitation was to disallow other common fees such as a
flat fee on water delivery.125 Further, the proposition placed voter limits and
114. Id.
115. Blount et al., supra note 109, at 1.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. George Lefcoe, Redevelopment in California: Its Abrupt Termination and a Texas-Inspired
Proposal for a Fresh Start, 44 THE URBAN LAW. 767, 767–810 (2012).
120. Id.
121. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 6502 (Deering 2019).
122. Understanding Proposition 218, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF. (Dec. 1996), https://lao.ca.g
ov/1996/120196_prop_218/understanding_prop218_1296.html.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.; John S. Throckmorton, What is a Property-Related Fee – An interpretation of California’s
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other general requirements on fees and assessments.126 Unlike the
redistributive effect of general taxes, the fee-based structure only allowed for
the fee to exist if it is at least roughly proportional to the services returned.127
As emphasized previously, floating bonds are within the legal capacity of
JPAs, some of the other methods, such as the use of TIF, will need to be
monitored closely in order to properly comply with state financing laws.
2. Tax Increment Financing Applied to the JPA
Though redevelopment agencies and their use of TIF is outlawed in
California, there are other legal mechanisms to make use of TIF in beneficial,
effective, and constitutional ways. Since TIF makes use of distinct districts
to create revenue in those areas, this proposed JPA would immediately
benefit if it selected a few economically tarnished areas to focus on. This has
been done in the past. Contra Costa County, for example, created a JPA and
utilized TIFs to construct one portion of a development at the Pleasant Hill
portion of Bay Area Rapid Transit (“BART”).128 The TIFs were used to pay
for various public infrastructure improvements, such as a patron parking
garages and the physical backbone infrastructure of the BART tracks.129
Similarly, a forestry management JPA could utilize TIFs in multiple
cities and towns encompassed by the JPA, even if each area had a different
local forest management motivation to do so, i.e. one county may need more
personnel for clean-up, while another may need to focus on fire prevention
methods. Given the expansive geographic scope of a forestry management
JPA, it would be helpful to retain an expert in infrastructure and
redevelopment to determine which areas would most lucratively benefit from
a redevelopment project.130 Experts are often necessary to develop regional
strategies, if not more specific regional financing strategies to effectuate
successful financial practices within the JPA.131
For example, Paradise, California is a town that could potentially
benefit from a redevelopment project. Paradise was completely devastated
from a wildfire, the ‘Camp Fire,’ in 2018.132 Prior to the fire, Paradise was
home to around 26,000 people; now, just around 2,000 are left due to the
Proposition 218, 48 HASTINGS L. J. 851, 1068 (1997).
126. See id. at 1067.
127. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 122.
128. SHISHIR MATHUR, INNOVATION IN PUBLIC TRANSPORT FINANCE: PROPERTY VALUE CAPTURE
(2014).
129. Id.
130. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11.
131. Id.
132. Colleen Hagerty, The Survivors, VOX (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.vox.com/the-highlight/
2019/10/16/20908291/camp-fire-wildfire-california-paradise-survivors.
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destruction of thousands of homes and fear of future fires.133 Paradise would
likely benefit if there was an established TIF district because the property tax
revenues from this area could spark economic redevelopment. Building new
profitable infrastructure through economic development is necessary for
Paradise to overcome its own economic devastation. The creation of a TIF
district will subsequently bring residents who left back into the Paradise area
and a new revenue stream will be produced that contributes to the JPAs forest
management objective. This could protect Paradise from additional
catastrophic wildfire damage and destruction.
Other states have TIF-based redevelopment statutes that could serve as
a template for financing this JPA (in addition to a template for TIF legislation
in general). In Texas, any town, city, or county, can establish a
redevelopment project area called a Tax Increment Reinvestment Zones
(“TIRZ”).134 TIRZ funding comes from property tax increments, sales tax
increments, or both.135 The “blight” requirement that TIF specifically
incorporates, however, is relaxed, and is instead replaced with the
requirement that the area’s present condition impairs the city’s growth or
constitutes an economic or social liability to public health, safety, morals or
welfare.136 The city, county, or private owners who start a TIRZ have their
own board of directors, which decentralizes redevelopment and avoids issues
that redevelopment agencies and TIFs have previously faced.137
The JPA could also make use of Enhanced Infrastructure Financing
Districts (“EIFDs”).138 EIFDs spawned from redevelopment agencies but
have become more popular due to their termination of voter approval
requirements and potential for project expansion.139 EIFDs finance
construction, acquisition costs, rehabilitation costs, and planning and design
expenses.140 However, EIFDs do not pay for maintenance or routine
operations.141 A vital component of the formation of EIFDs is the
infrastructure financing plan, where tax increment specifications and
projection for tax revenues from such increments must be laid out.142 EIFDs
are given a statutory framework in California Government Code section
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Lefcoe, supra note 119, at 788–89.
Id.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 27.
See generally Primer on California’s New Tax Increment Financing Tools, CAL. ASS’N FOR
LOCAL ECON. DEV., 7, (2017), https://www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Secti
on/Hot-Issues/New-Tax-Increment-Tools/CALED-TIF-Primer-3-17-FINAL.aspx.
139. Id. at 8.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 10.
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53398.50.143 A forestry management JPA should look to this Code, in
addition to other best practices from other states, in order to determine the
best TIF method incorporating the present issues.
Some believe that the overall process involved in a TIF is a flexible
funding source that avoids the bureaucratic red-tape and extreme delays
associated with grant programs.144 Therefore, utilizing something similar to
a TIF system, in conjunction with a multitude of grants, could alleviate the
pressures of finding one main source of funding for the JPA.

D. INDEPENDENT REVENUE STREAMS
Independent revenue streams are an additional way that JPAs can
receive funding.145 Though independent revenue streams are vital for some
other JPAs with simple, single project-specific goals, this particular forest
management JPA will likely need a steady stream of income throughout its
formation and execution because of its continuous work on forested land.
This JPA should therefore utilize multiple independent revenue streams for
the upfront costs of the JPA creation. Specifically, the board should apply
for Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) grants, Brownfield
grants, and other similar grants that are awarded to applicants who meet
certain criteria. FEMA provides grant funding for non-disaster preparedness
in order to insure protection against and mitigate high-consequence
emergencies.146 FEMA also grants Staffing for Adequate Fire & Emergency
Response funding (“SAFER”) to effectively fund fire departments and
volunteer firefighter organizations, both which are vital to forest fires and
management.147 Also, Brownfield grants grant funding to property that might
be compromised due to the presence of or potential hazardous substances or
materials.148 In this case, remnants and contaminants directly from previous
wildfires. Grants such as these would be efficacious and relevant to the
proposed JPA given the nature of the ultimate intended actions: disaster
preparedness, economic development in blighted areas (due to fire), and
emergency relief, all which would benefit from grants as an independent
revenue stream to upkeep the efficacy of the programs.
143. Id. at 8.
144. Wagner, supra note 98.
145. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 19.
146. Grants, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/grants (last modified Feb.
18, 2020).
147. Staffing for Adequate Fire & Emergency Response Grants, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT.
AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/staffing-adequate-fire-emergency-response-grants (last modified Dec.
18, 2019).
148. Overview of EPA’s Brownfields Program, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/brownfields/overview-epas-brownfields-program.
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Private donations are also helpful in funding JPAs, though they are
much harder to aggregate in an effective way unless there are a multitude of
large donors.149 Regardless, there are hundreds of local, state, and
government grant programs and donation prospects that would greatly
benefit the JPA formation, and should be utilized to the fullest extent.
IV. PROPOSAL
Many California counties susceptible to devastating wildfires would
benefit from the formation of a JPA to implement forest management
strategies and wildfire prevention methods quickly and effectively.
Specifically, counties with expansive forest and federal land (Placer,
Amador, Tuolumne, etc.) would benefit greatly from JPA formation.
Issuing revenue bonds to upfront cost and creating feedstock contracts
with land management agencies is a feasible stream of revenue. This would
fund the JPA wildfire prevention strategy and prevention at the onset. Using
these sources of revenue, the JPA would be able to fund a variety of wildfire
prevention and land management initiatives in different counties depending
on their specific characteristics and needs, ultimately creating a far-reaching,
need-specific, and helpful forest and land management JPA.
Issuing revenue bonds will ideally create revenue through the feedstock
contracts, but it is likely that this revenue will only be attainable in national
forests and on federal land because of the GNAs breadth. Because of this,
any TIF initiative should take place after any revenue bonds are issued. This
includes any alternate form of TIF that the JPA intends to replicate, such as
EIFDs or TIRZ. That way, there will be available funding for any expert
personnel needed to establish precisely where a TIF district (or the
equivalent) should be established.
By first establishing revenue through revenue bonds and subsequently
through feedstock contracts from federal lands and forests and then
developing TIF districts in areas that display a need for economic
revitalization, this system will allow for the build-up of accessible funds for
land that is not federal land, but instead private property that would not be
subject to GNAs. In other words, planning to first issue revenue bonds for
feedstock contracts will allow revenue to pile up. Then, the revenue can be
put towards figuring out a more substantial plan for other private, non-federal
land to implement other fire safety mechanisms. This is important because
the vast amount of land covered by this JPA is not necessarily federal land
yet needs to be protected from wildfire just as thoroughly.
Any revenue received through bonds should also be supplemented
149.

Cf. CYPHER & GRINNELL, supra note 11, at 17.
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through grants and private donations. Grants and private donations can
constitute a substantial amount of funding but require more upfront work at
the expense of the JPA board and any experts retained. As soon as a JPA
secures funding from a grant, the money is immediately available and can be
put to use quickly. Together, issued bonds and other independent revenue
streams will allow for the successful formation of a California JPA intended
to protect California from the catastrophic effects of wildfires.
V. CONCLUSION
There is still much to determine when it comes to the details and
formation of a forestry management JPA. Regardless, a JPA would be highly
beneficial in the execution of effective wildfire prevention. The nature of
wildfires will always be unpredictable to a certain extent, but creating a JPA
with numerous counties, local, and governmental agencies will, at the very
least, alleviate the financial and practical concerns (i.e. widespread support
and physical personnel) regarding forest management. The vast amount of
land that will be encompassed in the JPA that is proposed in this Note will
create innumerable options for how and when to generate revenue. Feedstock
contracts, notably, will be a great option for environmentally friendly
revenue. Therefore, once the procedural requirements such as notices of
agreement and fee agreements are settled and upfront costs are secured, a
forestry management JPA can begin to make California’s forests, and all of
its inhabitants, safer from future catastrophic wildfires and megafires.

